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Abstract—Community network (CN) initiatives have been
around for roughly two decades, evangelizing a distinctly differ-
ent paradigm for building, maintaining, and sharing network in-
frastructure but also defending the basic human right to Internet
access. Over this time they have evolved into a mosaic of systems
that vary widely with respect to their network technologies,
their offered services, their organizational structure, and the
way they position themselves in the overall telecommunications’
ecosystem. Common to all these highly differentiated initiatives
is the sustainability challenge.
We approach sustainability as a broad term with an eco-
nomical, political, and cultural context. We first review the
different perceptions of the term. These vary both across and
within the different types of stakeholders involved in CNs and
are reflected in their motivation to join such initiatives. Then,
we study the diverse approaches of CN operators towards the
sustainability goal. Given the rich context of the term, these
range all the way from mechanisms to fund their activities, to
organizational structures and social activities serving as incentives
for the engagement of their members. We iterate on incentive
mechanisms that have been proposed and theoretically analyzed
in the literature for CNs as well as tools and processes that have
been actually implemented in them. Finally, we enumerate lessons
that have been learned out of these two decades of CNs’ operation
and discuss additional technological and regulatory issues that
are key to their longer-term sustainability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Community networks (CNs) are networks inspired, built
and managed by citizens and non-profit organizations. They
are crowdsourced initiatives, whereby people combine their
efforts and resources to collectively instantiate communication
network infrastructures. Typically, CNs are initiated by small
groups of people who more often than not are driven by
strong cultural and political motives. Such motives include
the fight against the digital divide through the provision of
telecommunication services in under-served areas; the desire
for autonomy and self-organization practices; the right to open,
neutral networks and privacy; the opportunity to experiment
with technology in do-it-yourself manner; and the commitment
to community ideals and needs.
CNs originally surfaced in the late 90s and have taken
many forms and shapes ever since. Whereas some of them
have become obsolete due to the rise of commercial high
speed broadband networks in the areas they operated, others
have flourished and evolved into alternative telecommunication
network models (section I-A). Not only have they filled in the
coverage gaps of commercial operators providing telecommu-
nication services in rural under-served areas, but they have
also developed rich organizational frameworks with innovative
tools and mechanisms. Typically, these frameworks emerge
and evolve empirically as a result of past experiences, success-
ful and unsuccessful practices and accumulated knowledge.
They are meant to systematize the network’s governance,
management and operation processes and ensure the viability
of CNs. The establishment of sustainable economic models is
a key factor to this end.
A. Current motivating factors and new paths for CNs
While community networks focus on satisfying the needs
of local communities, there are currently good reasons moti-
vating a more active role in the overall telecommunications
landscape.
1) Contributing to broadband connectivity goals: Broad-
band Internet access has been promoted as a core priority
of top-level political agendas throughout the world. This is
reflected in initiatives such as the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG) of the United Nations (in the SDG9 about
resilient infrastructures) and the treatment of broadband access
as a key issue in the Internet Society and the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) among others. In Europe,
for example, the European Commission (EC) has set ambitious
policy objectives for the years to come, summarized under
the EC broadband 20201 and 20252 agendas. The realization
of these agendas demands huge investment costs on network
infrastructure, thus favoring approaches that share these costs
among different stakeholders. Grassroots initiatives such as
CNs are explicitly acknowledged as one possible approach to
amortize the network infrastructure deployment costs and one
of four ways to involve public authorities in the realization
of the broadband vision [1]. Community broadband networks
such as the guifi.net in Catalonia, Spain [2], RemIX [3] and
1https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/broadband-strategy-policy
2https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/broadband-europe
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Fig. 1: Radar charts following CN characteristics i.e., types of services and infrastructure used, number of participating nodes
(a) CN services. 0: local services as default (Internet connectivity available upon request, manual configuration), 1: mix of
local services and Internet connectivity, 2: Internet connectivity as the main service (only management tools as local services),
3: Internet connectivity only. (b) CN Infrastructure types. 0: the greatest part of the network is composed of backbone nodes,
there is a small number of access nodes, 1: the network is divided equally between the number of backbone nodes and the
number of access nodes, 2: the greatest part of the network is composed of access nodes, there are a few backbone nodes,
3: the network is composed by access nodes only (no backbone nodes). (c) CN Size. 0: Very small (number of nodes< 100),
1: Small (100 < number of nodes < 1000), 2: Medium (1000 < number of nodes < 10.000), 3: Large (number of nodes
> 10.000).
B4RN [4] in United Kingdom, are singled out as best practices
in this respect at the EC website.
2) Providing Internet access in developing regions: More
than half of the world population, in particular, the poor
and marginalized populations in developing areas, are still
offline [5]. In response to this fact, many large industrial
corporations such as Google, Microsoft and Facebook have
stated ambitious objectives to connect another billion users
around the globe.
Google launched Loon, a project aiming to reach uncovered
areas and offer them Internet connection using balloons flying
in the stratosphere. Facebook has been experimenting with a
high-altitude solar drones for providing Internet access around
the world.3 At the same time, Microsoft plans to bring Internet
to remote areas utilizing TV white spaces and collaborating
with telecommunication operators.
Community networks are well positioned to stand as al-
ternatives and/or complements to such global initiatives and
provide realistic implementation paths to their ambitious ob-
jectives. Combining the Do-It-Yourself culture with provisions
for unlicensed spectrum and cheap fibre, small crowdfunded
community operators that create local value for the local
people, without need for complex and centralized systems,
may be the obvious way to go about realizing the vision of
Internet access to developing regions.
3) Democratization of the telecommunication market: The
market of telecom services is usually composed of monopolies
and oligopolies that concentrate significant amount of power.
The prevention of telecommunications market distortions and
the openness of networks is acknowledged as a key goal by
3These two projects could be viewed as an evolution of the original HAPs
(High Altitude Platforms) concept. HAPs, such as balloons or unmanned
planes in circular orbits in the air, were proposed already in late 90s for
providing Internet connection to rural areas lacking fixed network infrastruc-
ture.
the ITU [6], the EC [1], and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) [7]. Monopolies lead
to vertically integrated models, where all the layers of the
network belong to one entity and end users are left with limited
options when it comes to choosing an operator.
The decentralized way in which they are built and oper-
ated makes CNs an ideal candidate model for separating the
network infrastructure from the service provision layer. This
separation generates opportunities for sharing the related costs
between multiple players and opening the network to public
administrations and commercial entities such as local/regional
ISPs (we elaborate on this model in section II.C).
B. Survey focus, methodological approach, and sources
Our survey does not aim at presenting the status of the
hundreds of CN efforts around the globe, nor is it a review
of the technologies used in CNs today. Such information is
already available in the CN literature [8], [9], [10]. Instead, the
focus of this survey is on the multiple, often complementary,
ways different CN initiatives pursue their sustainability. We
approach sustainability as a multi-faceted term, with technical,
economic, socio-cultural and political context. We review how
these networks fund their activities; which ones have been the
dominant motives behind their initiation and which ones are
the aspirations of other actors when participating in them; and
what kind of tools and processes are in place as incentives
in the different CNs to best respond to these motives and
aspirations.
Most of the material for this survey originates from in-
terviews, both in-person and questionnaire-based, carried out
in the context of the netCommons R&D project [11], [12].
Another big part, on proposed participation incentives and
mechanisms, is the result of an exhaustive review of the
existing scientific literature on the topic. Sixteen CNs are
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3CN Location Start Year Activity Nodes Networkingtechnology Internet Description
AWMN Greece 2002 active 300 wifi Yes*
Built by network technicians, enthusiasts and radio amateurs. Contains native
services without need for public Internet connectivity i.e., games, libraries,
network monitoring tools, DNS solutions, and experimental platforms.
B4RN UK 2011 active 4000 fibre Yes Started by a local volunteer, who led the group as a networking expert. Aimedat bridging the digital divide. Based exclusively on fiber.
Consume UK 2000 inactive x wifi Yes
One of the first CNs to be conceived and deployed in Europe. The original
motivation was to save Internet access fees for conducting business. It has
epitomised the anti-commercial model of networking. Not active anymore.
FFDN France,Belgium 2011 active 2500 wifi, DSL/fibre Yes
An umbrella organization embracing 28 CNs operating across France. Adheres
to values of collaboration, openness and support of human rights (freedom of
expression, privacy).
Free2Air UK 1999 inactive x wired, wifi Yes An alternative to the commercial Internet provision. Run by a small numberof artists and a number of other individuals until 2015.
Freifunk Germany 2002 active 40000 fibre, wifi Yes An open initiative that supports free computer networks in Germany. It attractedmany artists, activists and tech enthusiasts from all over Europe.
Funkfeuer Austria 2003 active 220 wireless Yes A free experimental wireless network across Austria, committed to the idea ofDIY, built and currently maintained by a group of computer enthusiasts.
guifi.net Global 2004 active 40000 fibre, wifi Yes* Started in Osona to serve remote rural areas that were not covered by conven-tional ISPs. Applies the principles of CPR management. Diverse communities
around the world.
i4Free Greece 2014 active* 2 wifi Yes The initiative of a German engineer and professor in an island of Greece withpoor Internet connectivity.
Ninux Italy 2003 active 172 wifi No Experimentation and hacking culture. Ninux operates as an experimentalplatform for decentralized protocols, policies and technologies.
Rhizomatica Mexico 2009 active N/A wireless Yes
Provides community mobile telephony services. Creates open-source technol-
ogy and helps communities build their own networks. Initiated by a small group
of people with knowledge of community organization and technology.
Sarantaporo.gr Greece 2010 active 153 wireless Yes People with origins from the area of Sarantaporo wanted to create a websitefor their village when they realized that there was no network connection.
TakNET Thailand 2012 active 20 wifi Yes
Established as an academic project at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT).
Follows the goal of bridging the digital divide in Thailand villages. Composed
of TakNET1, TakNET2 and TakNET3.
TFA US 2004 active 21 wifi Yes
The TFA project became true with the partnership of Rice University and
Technology for All (TFA) organization. It is an urban wireless mesh network
aiming to bridge the digital divide and provide Internet access in one low-
income neighborhood in Houston.
Wireless Leiden Netherlands 2002 active 120 wifi Yes
Volunteer-based open, inexpensive, fast wireless network in Leiden and sur-
rounding villages. Developed by a group of local residents. Provides Internet
access and free local communication.
Zenzeleni.net South Africa 2013 active 13 wifi
Yes, VoIP
public
phones
Initiated by researchers from the University of the Western Cape (UWC) in
the rural under-developed area of Mankosi. Solar powered network. Operated
as an umbrella co-operative enterprise and a telecoms provider.
TABLE I: Basic information about 16 CN instances that are analyzed further in the survey. These are chosen as representative
instances of the rich variety of worldwide CNs.
primarily discussed in this paper, as listed in Table I-A2.
They are selected as good representatives of the diversity in
existing CNs with respect to size (local vs. regional), supported
services (local services vs. Internet access), network scope/role
(backbone network vs. access network), geographical area
of coverage (urban areas with rich communication alterna-
tives vs. rural under-served areas), organizational structure
(involved actors and decision-making processes), and funding
sources. The radar chart of Fig. 1 depicts how these sixteen
CNs score on the first three attributes (size, services, network
role) on a 0-3 scale.
In the remainder of the survey, we first present the layered
network infrastructure model, which aims at maximal open-
ness and actors’ involvement, and explore how CNs fit in it
as open access network instances (section II). Then, in section
III, we iterate on the participation motives of different actors
and their implications for the CN sustainability. In section
IV, we elaborate on the economic sustainability aspects and
the funding sources of CNs; we also review some theoretical
models addressing the economic sustainability question. We
describe in section V incentive mechanisms that are either
practiced in different CNs or theoretically analyzed in the
literature. Section VI enumerates the most valuable insights
out of the survey, whereas section VII iterates on additional
challenges CN face at technical and regulations level. We
conclude the paper in section VIII.
II. NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURES AND
COMMUNITY NETWORKS
In this section, we seek to position CNs within the broader
picture of broadband communication networks. To this end, we
first describe what kind of infrastructure is typically deployed
in most CNs and the technologies they use. Then, we present
a layered model of network infrastructures that eases the
discussion of different operational business models met in
contemporary networks. Finally, we clarify how CNs position
with respect to this model and the implications for their
sustainability.
A. CN infrastructure and technologies in use
While a great number of CNs have utilized Wi-Fi to build
their networks and reduce infrastructure costs, others have
developed solutions based on fibre (e.g., BARN) or cellular
connectivity (e.g., Rhizomatica). In some cases (i.e., FFDN,
guifi.net), they have created federations of local networks,
where different types of technologies co-exist. The specificities
of each geographic area, the feasibility of different network
topologies, the deployment and maintenance cost, as well
as the profile of services attracting demand in each case,
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4Acronym Description
AP Access Point
CAPEX Capital Expenditure
CN Community Network
CONFINE Community Networks Testbed for the Future Internet
CPR Common Pool Resource
CS Community Service
DIY Do-It-Yourself
DNS Domain Name Server
EC European Commission
EU European Union
GFOSS Greek Free/Open Source Software Society
ICT Information and Communication Technology
ISP Internet Service Provider
ITU International Telecommunications Union
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
NCL Network Commons License
NP Network Provider
NPO Non-Profit Organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEX Operational Expenditure
P2P Peer to Peer
P2PWNC Peer-to-peer Wireless Network Confederation
PIP Physical Infrastructure Provider
SP Service Provider
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
WCED World Commission Environment and Development
WCL Wireless Commons License
TABLE II: Terminology used throughout the paper.
may favor one technology or another or a combination of
technologies (TableI-A2).
Access Network Backbone Network
Node B1
UE
UE
UE
UE
Node B2
Node B3Node B4
Node A1
Node A2
Fig. 2: Backbone and access nodes in a wireless mesh network
using Wi-Fi.
The key component of a CN is a network node (a router).
Nodes are devices that either relay the network’s data (back-
bone nodes) or provide network access (access points or
access nodes) to end-user devices (client nodes). The set of
backbone nodes constitutes the backbone network and the set
of access nodes forms the access network (Fig.2). Topologies
differ depending on the way nodes are arranged within the
network, the way they form links between them, and whether
links are point-to-point or point-to-multipoint. Links can be
either wireless (Wi-Fi, cellular) or wired (fiber, DSL etc.)
so that both the backbone and the access network may use
wired or wireless technology options for connecting backbone
nodes and the end user (UE), respectively. The combination of
technologies is also quite common in most networks, where
wireless technology complements a wired network and vice
versa.
• Wireless technologies: Wi-Fi is used in point-to-point
mode to bridge long distances or in mesh topology to
cover areas. A mesh topology refers to nodes that tend
to connect with each other directly rather than through
a hierarhical tree or ring topology. This feature allows
connecting the nodes through multiple independent paths.
If one link is broken or degraded, an alternative route can
always compensate for it.
Another type of wireless technology used in the access
network is cellular, mainly the GSM technology, even if
it is outdated in many areas worldwide. Access nodes
are basically base stations that connect mobile users.
The cellular technology divides the area into cells and
installs fixed radio towers to support the coverage in each
cell. The used frequencies are different from the ones
used in Wi-Fi. Notably, operation in these bands requires
the acquisition of a license, in contrast to the free and
unlicensed Wi-Fi frequency bands.
• Wired technologies: Fiber is a medium that offers large
bandwidth and low interference for the transmission of
information, resulting in very high data rates. In principle,
it can be used to construct an entire telecommunication
network (backbone and access network) or a part of
it. Due to its high cost, it is most commonly used
in the backbone network, combined with Wi-Fi access.
However, there are exemplary cases of low-cost rural fiber
self-deployments such as in the B4RN and guifi.net CNs.
An alternative wired technology in use is the DSL
technology, which utilizes telephone lines to transmit
telecommunication services. The FFDN network leases
such lines to provide Internet access to its members. It is
the most economical wired solution for CN development,
thanks to the pre-existing telephony network installations
and infrastructure.
B. Network infrastructure layers
Considering how a broadband network is created, its struc-
ture can be decomposed into three distinct but inter-dependent
layers: a) passive infrastructure, b) active infrastructure and
c) services.
Passive infrastructure
Active infrastructure
Services
Fig. 3: The layers of a broadband network.
The passive infrastructure layer consists in the required
non-electronic physical equipment for deploying the network.
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5Non-electric elements vary depending on the link technology
in use, e.g., fiber, copper, radio. They typically refer to
ducts, cables, masts, towers, technical premises, easements
etc.. The passive infrastructure is built to endure for many
years, usually decades. Its development demands high capital
expenditure (CAPEX) and frequent upgrades are difficult to
realize. However, its operational costs (OPEX) are relatively
low.
The second layer, i.e., active infrastructure, denotes the
electronic physical equipment of a network such as routers,
switches, antennas, transponders, control and management
servers. The OPEX of the active equipment is high (e.g.,
electricity costs) but its capital expenditure is usually low
since it involves up-to-date technological elements. The active
equipment needs to follow the rapid advances of technology
and get renewed frequently, i.e., more than once within a
decade.
The third and highest layer of a broadband network is the
layer of services. It corresponds to the telecommunication
services provided on top of the passive and active infras-
tructure. These services may be both private and public and
include electronic government, education, health, e-commerce,
Internet access, entertainment, telephony (e.g., VoIP), access
to media content (television, radio, movies) and many more.
End users usually pay a fee for receiving the services either
directly or indirectly. The type of reimbursement depends
on the chosen network infrastructure model and the involved
business actors.
The implementation of the service layer is conditioned
on the deployment of the passive and active infrastructure.
Therefore, the first two layers are a prerequisite for the
existence of the third one (Fig.3).
C. Business actors
Business actors are determined in accordance with the net-
work infrastructure layers [1],[13],[14],[8]. They are typically
providers of the network equipment and services. Telecom
operators and private companies, public authorities, local co-
operatives and housing associations, are some characteristic
examples of business actors.
In detail, the physical infrastructure provider (PIP) has
ownership of the passive equipment and undertakes the equip-
ment maintenance and operation responsibilities. PIPs can be
divided into backbone PIPs and access area PIPs, depending
on which network parts they possess. Backbone PIPs invest
in the backbone network infrastructure, while access area
PIPs own and moderate the infrastructure aimed for providing
connections to the end users, i.e., first-mile connectivity. In
the case of CNs, a local organization may participate as a
backbone PIP, an access PIP or both.
The network provider (NP) owns and operates the active
equipment. It leases physical infrastructure installations from
the PIPs and makes its equipment available for the provision
of services by other SPs or provides its own services. Network
providers may be public authorities, private companies, local
cooperatives who own the equipment or entities who are
subcontracted to operate them by one of the aforementioned
owner entities.
The service provider offers services within the network.
Service providers are typically companies that utilize the
network’s active and passive equipment to offer their services
to end users in exchange for compensation, typically payment.
The payment can be direct (service fee) or indirect (connection
or network fee). They need access to the NP’s interface and
install their own devices if and where needed. The provision
of services within the network is vital for the end user
engagement and therefore the network’s viability.
D. Network infrastructure business models
The roles and responsibilities of different business actors
in network infrastructures vary, resulting in a great range of
business models (Fig. 4). Traditional telecom models follow
the concept of vertical integration. In these models, the
ownership and operation of all three infrastructure layers is
concentrated in one single entity. As a consequence, cases
of monopolies or oligopolies that hamper the existence of
competitors by exercising great control over the market, i.e.,
”market failure” cases, are common. Moreover, due to lack of
other competing entities, a single vertically integrated operator
is often not willing to provide broadband access to remote
areas featuring high network expansion costs, leaving several
rural areas under-served. To reverse this picture, the ITU [6]
and the EC [1], have set as primary goal the promotion
of infrastructure separation and sharing through legislation,
regulation and subsidies. Open access networks have been
brought to focus in this respect.
The openness of a network is characterized by the presence
of multiple providers in the market offering customers the
opportunity to choose between them. Open access network
models separate the ownership from the use of infrastructure
layers (i.e., PIP, NP, SP), in order to promote competition,
enable the sharing the network infrastructure costs and dis-
courage vertical integration.
Figure 4 captures the possible models that can emerge
with respect to the functional separation across layers, as
recommended by ITU [6]. Although the borderline between
the respective actors is not always clearcut, they range all the
way from vertical integration across all layers in e, f, g, to
partial separation in a, b, d, and full functional separation
in c. The models imply different alternatives and therefore
competition at each layer, except for the passive infrastructure,
where a single actor is typically in charge of deploying and
operating either the backbone or the access area PIP. Whereas
all models except for g offer alternatives with respect to service
provision, only d, e provide alternatives regarding network
provision.
Diverse types of local cooperative schemes can fit in these
models. Municipal networks focus on maximizing connectivity
from public (municipal) interest point of view. They usually
rely on public-private partnerships. The service is defined and
governed by the public partner but implemented and operated
by one or multiple private partners. Typical examples are the
optical fiber service from Stokab in the Stockholm region,
among several other regions in Europe, which follows the d
model; or the public WiFi services in most European cities,
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6PIP – Physical Infrastructure Provider
NP – Network Provider
SP – Service Provider
LLUB – Local Loop Unbundling (Forzati 2010)
CPR
SP SP CSCS
CN
CPR – Common Pool Resource
CS – Community service
Fig. 4: The components of a broadband network (with a focus
on optical fiber) and the three network infrastructure layers.
which can follow any model for service provision as the
public entity just defines, funds and oversees the public service
under private operation. A more familiar example of local
cooperation constitute the Internet eXchange Points (IXPs),
which are physical infrastructure elements letting Internet ser-
vice providers (ISPs) and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs)
exchange Internet traffic between their networks (Autonomous
Systems). The switching infrastructure is built and managed as
a CPR according to Fig.4, but the governance may range from
a centralized a to a participatory CN model. IXPs and CNs are
quite equivalent, the main difference being that IXPs connect
larger entities only (wholesale) and CNs focus on individuals
and households (retail). However, the difference blurs as CNs
grow bigger. Two such examples are guifi.net, which serves
both as a CN and a de-facto regional IXP, and Ninux, which
acts like a country IXP of diverse city and regional networks,
and is connected to the Rome IXP (Namex).
E. CNs as open access network instances: the commons model
CNs differ from other models in that crowdsourcing is
practiced at all layers. Cooperative models can be a viable way
to deploy infrastructure, particularly when such infrastructure
cannot be built efficiently by a single entity, or duplicated and
left to competition. However, cooperation requires coordina-
tion, which, when not done properly, may lead to failure. CNs
are examples of ‘commons’ managed as common property, a
collective good, also known as a common-pool resource (CPR)
[15].
This is a traditional and recognized governance model
for shared resource systems such as irrigation systems or
fishing grounds. The participants must accept the rules to join
the network and must contribute the required infrastructure
to do so (routers, links, and servers). Yet, they retain the
ownership of hardware they have contributed and the right to
withdraw. As a result, the infrastructure is shared and managed
collectively. Multiple service providers can benefit from that
network infrastructure CPR to provide and compete for a range
services.
In the light of the commons model, CNs embody key
principles [2]:
Non-discriminatory and open access. The access is non-
discriminatory because any pricing, when practiced, is deter-
mined using a cooperative, rather than competitive, model.
Typically this results in a cost-oriented model (vs. market-
oriented) applying the fair-trade principle for labor pric-
ing [16]. It is open because everybody has the right to join
the infrastructure.
Open participation. Everybody has the right to join the
community. According to roles and interests, several main
groups could be identified as stakeholders: i) volunteers in-
terested in aspects such as neutrality, privacy, independence,
creativity, innovation, DIY, or protection of consumers rights;
ii) commercial entities interested in aspects such as demand,
service supply, and stability of operation; iii) end users (i.e.,
customers), interested in network access and service consump-
tion; and iv) public agencies (local or national), interested in
regulating the participation of society and the usage of public
space, and even in satisfying their own telecommunication
needs. Preserving a balance among these or other stakeholders
is desirable, as every group has natural attributions that should
not be delegated or undertaken by any other. It is important
to clarify that not all stakeholders are present in all CNs. For
instance, many CNs object to the participation of commercial
entities as this is against their vision and philosophy (e.g.,
B4RN).
As a rule, cooperation at the network deployment and oper-
ation level is crucial, i.e., contributing and deploying network
infrastructure to be used as a ”commons”, but competition
in the service provision is encouraged, i.e., each participant
provides their own services and customers can choose among
them, to avoid monopoly situations.
Comparing the CN commons model with the more general
model for open access networks in Fig. 4:
• the CPR (i.e., participants of the network, legal entity)
replaces the PIP and NP actors;
• the CPR offers access to private service providers (SPs)
but also provides community services (CSs).
An example of the commons model in action is provided
by the guifi.net CN. The network employs cost sharing and
compensation mechanisms in order to facilitate the partici-
pation of commercial SPs and operators in the CN. They
deliver their services through the network infrastructure and
receive payment from their customers. At the same time, they
can contribute infrastructure and invest money to the CPR or
compensate the network for using it [17].
Despite the attractive features of the commons model in
terms of openness, it complicates considerably the sustainabil-
ity question for CNs. The economical dimension is one aspect
of the problem. CNs need to secure the active participation
of all stakeholders in ways that ensure the continuous funding
of their activities. This also involves determining acceptable
ways of co-existence with commercial service providers and
coping with challenges of both technical and regulatory flavor
(ref. section VII). On the other hand, CNs need to stand
up to the expectations they have raised and serve all those
social/ethical/cultural values that serve as participation motives
for their members. In the next section, we detail we enumerate
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7the variety of such motives, which demonstrate most clearly
the social/cultural implications of the sustainability issue for
CNs, beyond the purely economical aspects.
III. CN STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR MOTIVES
Sustainability is a multifaceted concept used to study a
variety of systems such as technical, biological and socio-
cultural ones. Its precise definition depends on the system
of interest. In general, the sustainability challenge consists in
understanding the way that a system can smoothly operate in
the present and develop in the future. Hence, sustainability
is not a specific goal per se but a continuous process to
reach a goal. Although, originally the term was used in an
environmental context (United Nations World Commission
on Environment and Development (WCED) 1987), it more
recently acquired broader social and economical semantics
(World Summit on Social Development, 2005).
Equally broad is the context of sustainability in the case of
community networks, which are by definition complex socio-
technical systems. Contrary to the commercial production
communication networks, their existence per se is conditioned
on the sustained and active participation of all its stakeholders,
who contribute resources and generate value for it. There-
fore, a sustainable network should first of all ensure that all
these actors, primarily end users, but also commercial service
providers and public organizations when they are present,
have proper commitments and incentives to contribute to the
network. This is not a trivial task since the participation
of each actor is driven by different types of motives and
aspirations, including economical, socio-cultural, and political
ones. Hence, the network needs to put in place mechanisms,
limits and incentive mechanisms to properly address these
aspirations, as in any commons regime [15].
The success of the CN to attract a critical mass of actors
also determines the funding alternatives of a CN. A sustainable
funding model, which will ensure the network capability to
cover its deployment and maintenance expenses, is a crucial
parameter for its long-term viability.
We review the practices of different CNs with respect to
funding in section IV. In the remainder of this section, we
describe the broadly varying motives met across and within
the different actors in a CN. Then, in section V, we describe
how different CNs respond to these motives.
A. Volunteers
In the context of CNs, volunteers are the people who initiate
the CN project. More often than not, (a subset of) these people
take an active role in the network expansion, either through
helping with the technical matters and/or organizing informa-
tional and training events for potential participants [18].
The volunteer groups usually comprise of people that cu-
mulatively possess knowledge and expertise over a wide set
of areas, including technical, legal, and finance matters [19]:
technology enthusiasts, radio amateurs, hackers, (social media)
activists, and academics. It is not uncommon for volunteers to
create a legal entity (Fig. 5) to represent the network to third
parties (i.e., government, third party organizations, companies,
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Fig. 5: Radar chart with legal forms found in CNs. CN legal
forms. 0: None, 1: organization (NPO, Foundation), 2: social
entrepreneur, 3: operator, ISP.
Internet Service Providers (ISPs)). This lets them have a voice
and interface with third parties on legal and regulatory matters,
but also get involved in financial transactions (e.g., collecting
user subscriptions, fund raising, purchase of equipment).
Their motives have a strong bias towards political and socio-
cultural values and ideals, which is not met in any of the other
three stakeholder groups. Experimentation with technology,
open software and do-it-yourself (DIY) tools, sensitivity to
privacy and network neutrality, the desire to bridge the digital
divide, but also commitment to the community spirit and social
movement, participatory governance and decision-making, and
protection of consumers’ rights, count as primary reasons for
their involvement in CN initiatives. Economic motivations are
much rarer; on the contrary, the members of the volunteers’
groups usually end up investing a lot of personal effort, time,
and money to the CN initiative, without direct financial return
of any kind. More specifically:
1) Socio-Economic motives: Socio-cultural motives often
stand behind the original conception and deployment of CNs.
Bridging the digital divide: The right to (broadband) con-
nectivity is a matter of equal opportunities in the contemporary
digital society; and digital illiteracy puts at disadvantage
populations deprived of it. The launch of CN initiatives has
many times been the response to poor or non-existent access to
the Internet and Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) services. This is typically the case with remote, sparsely
populated rural areas, where commercial operators are reluc-
tant to invest on fixed broadband infrastructure because they
do not deem this cost-efficient.
The initial volunteers’ group typically consists of local
residents suffering from the digital divide (as the case is with
the B4RN [11] and guifi networks [13]). However, help may
also come from outside the local community. In the case of
the Sarantaporo.gr network, in Greece, the CN came out of
the efforts of a small group of people living in Athens and
abroad, with origins from the Sarantaporo area, by the time
that no broadband access alternative was available there. The
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8Technology for All (TFA) Wireless Network in US got strong
support by the Rice university, in order to provide Internet
access to low-income communities, coupled with access to
education, employment offers etc. [20].Likewise, the i4Free
network in an island with poor Internet connectivity close to
the town of Nafpaktos, in Greece, started from the initiative of
a German engineer and professor. He created a small network
at his own expenses so that locals could have access to ICT
services [13], [11], [21]. Motivated by similar reasons, Peter
Bloom founded Rhizomatica to promote mobile-phone based
services in the rural area of Oaxaca, Mexico [58].
Economic incentives: these are in a sense relevant when-
ever a CN is set up in pursuit of cheaper (affordable) In-
ternet access. In these cases, the underlying idea is how to
expand coverage of the service, ensure its sustainability and
sovereignty from commercial decisions, and save money with
CNs compared to commercial alternatives rather than how to
make money out of the CN initiative.
Therefore, in remote, sparsely populated areas, such as the
rural areas addressed by the B4RN initiative, the competing
alternatives, where they exist, such as satellite or cellular, are
typically more expensive and of lower quality. B4RN was
conceived also as a way to offer better connections at more
affordable prices than its competitors, again in areas where
these exist.
Another case, this time in urban environment, is the Con-
sume network in East London, UK, one of the very first
CN initiatives in Europe. James Stevens ran a technology
incubation business offering web, live streaming and video
distribution services through a leased optic fiber connection.
He came up with the idea to connect buildings through
wireless mesh links as a way to bypass the expensive license
costs and regulatory constraints related to expanding the fiber
communication across the buildings.
2) Political motives: Political causes often serve as driving
forces for the groups that lead CN initiatives. Such causes
often prove to be strong enough to fuel these groups’ active
involvement with the CN despite the effort, time and money
this requires. They include:
Openness, net neutrality, and privacy: These highly
controversial issues have served as primary motivations for
CN initiatives. The principle of net neutrality dictates that
traffic within the network should be treated in an equal
manner independently of the type of content or the source.
The data communicated across the network is not subject to
discrimination.
A characteristic example of principles underlying the CN
initiatives is found in the community license by the guifi.net
Foundation, the volunteers’ group that has developed and still
operates the guifi CN, in Catalonia, Spain [22], [23], [24]:
• Freedom to use the network, as long as the other users,
the contents, and the network itself are respected.
• Freedom to learn the working details of network elements
and the network as a whole.
• Freedom to disseminate the knowledge and the spirit of
the network.
• Freedom to offer services and contents.
Moreover, volunteers are often interested in accessing ICT ser-
vices without having to compromise their privacy. This applies
for technology enthusiasts, activists and users in general that
wish to protect their private content. CNs such as the French
FFDN and the German Freifunk declare privacy/anonymity
and net neutrality as integral parts of their manifesto and
incorporate them in their fundamental operation principles.
Autonomy and alternative communication models: These
are common motives for the original deployment and subse-
quent operation of CNs [9], especially in urban areas, where
the digital divide threat is much less pronounced. Commu-
nity networks such as Consume45 and Free2Air67 started
out representing alternative approaches to the commercial
Internet provision, aiming at higher freedom and control over
personal communications. In other cases, such as guifi.net,
which started as an attempt to bridge the digital divide, such
political purposes emerged as an equally strong motivating
factor, especially when the number of network connectivity
alternatives increased. In the case of Rhizomatica, the initiative
was launched to serve two purposes: bridge the digital divide
in areas without alternative telecom solutions, and create a
more affordable telecommunications network in areas that
such alternatives existed.
3) Socio-cultural motives: Socio-cultural motives often
stand behind the original conception and deployment of CNs.
Among the main ones count:
Experimentation with technology and DIY culture: Sev-
eral initiatives are driven by hackers, technology enthusiasts,
and academics who enjoy experimenting with network and
radio technologies. The involvement within such a community
presents them with a unique opportunity to further enhance
their technical knowledge and practice it over real networks.
The AWMN, Ninux, and Freifunk CNs were initiated and
are still run by network technicians and computer enthusiasts.
As such, they have been characterized by a culture of experi-
mentation and improvisation. AWMN and Ninux, in particular
are used by their volunteers as testbeds for manufacturing
equipment (antennas, feeders) and experimenting with routing
protocols and applications. This is evidenced also in the
impressive number of native applications and services that
were developed for AWMN, without need for public Internet
connectivity, including games, libraries, network monitoring
tools, DNS solutions, and experimental platforms. Notably,
neither AWMN nor Ninux, whose initials stand for ”No Inter-
net, Network Under eXperiment”, nominally provide Internet
access.
The TFA project was created with a combination of societal
and technical objectives. Apart from empowering the local
community with access to technology, the network provides
an excellent opportunity of creating and carrying out research
on a three-layered wireless network platform, serving as a real
testbed.
Community spirit and altruism: Altruism, often coupled
with a strong commitment to community ideals serve as
4http://consume.net/
5http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Consume
6http://www.free2air.org/
7http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Free2Air
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9important motivations for the active involvement of volunteers’
groups in CNs.
Both are strongly evidenced in the B4RN, Sarantaporo.gr
and i4Free CN initiatives. Community activists have been
among the leading figures in B4RN and have set it up as
a community benefit society which can never be bought by a
commercial operator and its profits can only be distributed
to the community. Likewise, the Sarantaporo.gr non-profit
organization involves people who are activists in the area of
commons and supporters of community ideals. They place a
lot of emphasis on cultivating these ideals in the residents of
the area with parallel activities and social events. Finally, the
leading figure behind the i4Free CN, identifies himself as a
warm fan of community life and ideals. He has spent enormous
amounts of time trying to build a community around the CN
through training and educational events, even without much
success as he admits [11].
B. Active participants
Even broader is the variety of reasons for the involvement of
citizens in a community network. Decisive for many of them
is the expectation of available and abundant local connectivity
anywhere is needed. Furthermore there is the expectation of
cheaper, or even free, Internet access and other services pro-
vided by commercial entities. For others, the CN represents a
perfect opportunity to acquire new knowledge and experiment
with technologies, and/or socialize and become part of a bigger
community. Activism in favor of higher autonomy and data
privacy are also evidenced as user participation motives, albeit
to a smaller extent than in volunteer groups.
Their levels of participation typical vary a lot within a
CN. Some of them are highly active participating in events
organized by volunteers or other types of collective activities,
sharing their technical experience, developing applications and
devoting personal time and efforts to the CN. On the other
extreme, a number of users that tends to be the majority in
most CNs, set up a node and use the CN to get Internet access
or access to local services without further contributing to the
activities of the community. However, the presence of even
these passive users can benefit the network to the extent that
others can join the CN through their nodes.
The CN users may contribute a connectivity fee for being
part of the CN or not. These fees serve to pay the necessary
costs to upgrade or maintain the CN infrastructure. Depending
on whether they receive some service over the CN, they may
pay a consumption fee and maintain a contributor, shareholder
or customer relationship with the CN, directly or indirectly
through paying service fees to a commercial service provider
acting as intermediary and value-added reseller.
1) Socio-Economic motives: Users often expect benefits of
economic nature from their participation in a CN, both direct
and indirect.
Direct economic benefits: The most usual one is local
connectivity or Internet access that is not offered by other
providers, or at lower cost than alternative solutions, offered by
commercial telecom operators (Table I-A2). A characteristic
example to this end is Rhizomatica, which has managed to
reduce costs by 98% on international (U.S.) calls and 66% on
cellphone calls.
In general, Internet connectivity is either provided by the
CN itself, which takes on the role of an alternative Internet
service provider (e.g., B4RN, Sarantaporo.gr); as an add-
on service over the CN by a third party (e.g., guifi.net,
Rhizomatica); or by CN members who pro bono share their
access with other peers (e.g., guifi.net, AWMN).
The collective efforts of the CN participants is often
fundamental for expanding the coverage of the network or
lowering the connectivity cost. For instance, B4RN partially
crowdsources the cost and effort involved in deploying fiber in
rural communities in Northern England. This way, it can offer
fiber connectivity and Internet speed in under-served areas and
at more favorable prices than alternative commercial solutions.
Notably, a locally maintained infrastructure feeds the local
economy in multiple ways. First, paid jobs are created for
deploying, maintaining, expanding and operating the network
itself and its services (content and applications); or they
become enabled by the network (telework, remote assistance,
surveillance, sensing).
Then, CNs create opportunities for local investment. Locals
can obtain economic benefit from investing in local infrastruc-
tures, particularly more durable fiber infrastructures, which
can have good returns in terms of usage fees. At the same
time, such infrastructures yield indirect economic benefits
by increasing the value of households, typically the largest
investment of a family.
Indirect economic benefits: Participation in a CN may
incur additional benefits to their users. One of them relates
to the growth of human capital and another to the added
value that the CN generates for businesses and professionals
participating in it. Examples from Sarantaporo.gr and AWMN
show that young people (in the age of 18-35) view the CNs
as a path to information about job and further education
opportunities and to business activities developed around the
CN [11]. Moreover, in remote rural areas, network access
and Internet connectivity can enable professionals to search
better markets for their products and cheaper suppliers for
their materials (e.g., farmers) and small business owners to
join the network in the anticipation that visitors appreciate
the Internet connectivity feature when choosing where to go
(e.g., Sarantaporo.gr). Underserved communities in terms of
connectivity tend to suffer from fragility or lack of other
critical infrastructures. The deployment of networking infras-
tructures creates economies of sharing and bundling, such as
improvements in electrification, with the introduction of solar
panels, that for instance can enable or improve the quality of
night-time lighting and food preservation, which in turn may
create economic benefits from trading of these products.
2) Political motives: As seen in section III-A2, many CNs
have been initiated under aspirations of privacy, net neutrality,
and alternative models of Internet connectivity provision with
strong flavor of autonomy and self-organization. The ideals
underlying the initial development of these CNs are often
inherited by subsequent users of the CN. However, these users
tend to be a small part of the total CN user population.
Typically, the larger the CN grows the harder it becomes to
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find political causes that unite the whole community behind
them.
Openness, net neutrality and privacy: The aspects of
privacy and neutrality have a strong role in CNs that utilize the
Picopeering agreement8 as a participation/operations frame-
work and are part of the movement for open wireless radio
networks9 (e.g., Freifunk, guifi.net, Ninux, FFDN).
The Picopeering agreement is a baseline template formal-
izing the interaction between two network peers. It caters for
a) an agreement on free exchange of data; b) an agreement
on providence of open communication by publishing relevant
peering information; c) no service level guarantees; d) users’
formulations of use policies; and e) local amendments depen-
dent on the will of node owners.
Autonomy and self-organization: The participation in CN
groups cultivates feelings of autonomy and self-organization.
Self organization is practised in the way new users connect to
the CN, where they have to rely on their own resources and the
voluntary assistance of experienced network members. Being
part of an independent network satisfies personal ideological
aspirations for self-organized network and autonomous use
[9]. The ability to participate in collective decision making
and contribute to an alternative ”commons”-based model of
ICT access counts itself as a worthy experience for users with
strong ”commons” ideals.
3) Socio-cultural motives: A CN is a characteristic example
of participatory involvement, where users dedicate their efforts
and time to the network [25]. A number of services and
applications combined with other activities that one way or
another revolve around the CN, offer users the opportunity to
communicate, educate and entertain themselves, thus further
motivating their participation in the network [8], [26].
Experimentation and training with ICT: Technology en-
thusiasts participate in the network for experimenting with the
technology i.e., trying software they develop and modify, make
network speed measurements, play with network mapping
and management tools [9]. Users can acquire new skills
about computer and network use, i.e., either through self-
experimentation or through training by network experts.
In CNs initiated by volunteers with technical background
(e.g., AWMN, Ninux, Freifunk), the amount and type of
services, applications and self-produced software increased
greatly within the community. Besides a variety of network
monitoring tools, users can enjoy communication services such
as VoIP, online forums, mails, and instant messaging; data
exchange services with servers, community clouds and file
sharing systems; entertainment services with gaming appli-
cations and audio/video broadcasting tools; information and
educating services with online seminars, e-learning platforms,
and wikis.
Desire for social interaction: The smooth operation and
development of a CN demands cooperation links at the
network infrastructure level but also at the social level. In
CNs, participants are able to share their ideas and interests,
participate in groups, interact and communicate with other
8http://www.picopeer.net/PPA-en.shtml
9https://openwireless.org/.
network members just like they would in any other online or
physical community. Social networking and communication
tools raise great interest and remain active even when other
tools and services have a drop in their utilization.
The importance of local relationships in a CN [27] is also
evidenced in three independent studies addressing a rural
village in Zambia [28], the TakNet CN, in the rural area of
northern Thailand [29], as well as Australian and Greek CNs
in [9]. In this last study, 91.2% of the users stated that they
enjoyed interacting with the community, 88% felt that their
efforts would be returned by other community members and
80.5% expressed that the community allowed them to work
with people that they could trust and share similar interests.
Likewise, in the case of TakNet, much of the activity among
users of the popular applications such as messaging, email,
online social networks and gaming, exhibits a high degree of
locality, i.e., people use Internet to interact with people within
the same CN.
Socio-psychological motives: As social motives count
socially-aware mechanisms that relate to concepts such as vis-
ibility, acknowledgment, social approval, individual privileges
and status. This social activity is applied within the networks’
technical limits [30].
The ability to compete with other people and satisfy one’s
self esteem through the involvement in the community, or
receive a certain type of credit by others in the commu-
nity, are motives not as easy to distinguish but still present
[9], [29], [28], [31] and with an impact on network growth
and operation [32], [33].
C. Private sector service providers (professionals)
Private sector service providers form the stakeholder type
that may be less involved in CN initiatives. The term points
to companies, ISPs, small businesses or individuals, namely
entities that support or use the network to provide some
service and get compensated for it. These can be a) the
professionals that are involved in the installation, operation
and maintenance of the CPR network infrastructure, or b) the
organizations that provide content or services inside the CN.
At first glance, these entities do over the CN what they do
over any other network, i.e., provide services where there is
demand for them. However, the legal provisions and conditions
of running business over the CN may be different given the
existence of a CPR infrastructure and the governance and the
crowdsourced nature of it. In fact, the CPR is an enabler of
small private sector providers. Since the network commons is a
shared resource, that enables these small players to operate and
provide services over a larger population, with the economies
of scale of cooperative aggregation of CAPEX and OPEX
among multiple participants, and the complementarity and
opportunities of specialization among them. This also means
a lower barrier or entry, with much less initial investment and
less risk thanks to the cooperative, and cost oriented model,
of the network commons. Therefore the network infrastructure
commons becomes a critical resource for the operation and
competitiveness of these local private sector service providers.
Therefore the common goal would be preserving the commons
to enable their specific business models.
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CN Legal form Funding
AWMN AWMN Foundation Members (individually)
B4RN Community Benefit Society Members
Consume None Central actors
FFDN Non-Profit Organization Members, Local authorities, Donations
Free2Air Incorporated Legal Company Members
Freifunk Non-Profit Organization Members, Public Institutions
Funkfeuer None Members
guifi.net Guifi.net Foundation Members
i4Free None Central actor
Ninux None Members
Rhizomatica Non-Profit Organization
Members, National and International orga-
nizations, Donations
Sarantaporo.gr Non-Profit Organization Members, European Union, Donations
TakNET Social enterprise - Net2home
Members, Private Insitutions, THNIC Foun-
dation, European Union
TFA Non-Profit Organization
Members, Foundations, Public Institutions,
Donations
Wireless Leiden Non-Profit Organization Members, Public/Private Institutions
Zenzeleni.net Formal Network/Telecom Operator Members, Public Institutions
TABLE III: CN specific organizational aspects.
The incentives for the participation of private sector service
providers in the network are almost always economic. These
actors are interested in profit. The CN provides them with
access to potential customers who would otherwise be un-
reachable. The implementation of their commercial activities
depends on the organizational nature of the CN. Guifi.net
has set up a framework that enables the participation of
private sector in its CN, including maintainers, installers,
ISP providers, VoIP providers (Table III-C). These entities
may sign agreements with the guifi.net Foundation, when the
service provision has to do with the sustainability of the CPR.
External Over-The-Top (OTT) services, such as Internet VOIP,
Video, content providers are left outside. In Rhizomatica, ISPs
and VOIP providers are key partners of the organization.
Rhizomatica provides the Radio Access Network through
which the service providers reach the local communities and
their CN users. Network, such as TFA or guifi.net, include a
self-sustainable business model where ISPs provide Internet
access over the network.
D. Public agencies
Public agencies have the natural role of regulating the
public space, either for service provision, occupation of public
spectrum, public land, but also supporting local develop-
ment and ensuring access rights to public information and
services. Public agencies have a responsibility to regulate
the deployment and service provision of CNs, as with any
other entity performing these activities. Furthermore, they may
cooperate with a CN when the mission of both align. They
may contribute to its deployment and growth through funding
the initiative, sponsoring network equipment, consuming CN
services, facilitating its expansion and growth or by permitting
the use of public space and resources by a CN. In Catalonia,
the Foundation operating guifi.net has developed the Universal
format [34], a template municipal ordinance, that allows
municipalities to regulate public, commercial and community
entities to deploy shared infrastructures in public space. Under
these principles, several local authorities have allowed guifi.net
groups to dig public space and lay down fiber for expanding
the network. In several German cities, Freifunk is given the
permission to set up antennas and equipment in the roof top
of churches, Town Halls, or other public buildings.
Quite often other types of public agencies get involved in
the network. Sarantaporo.gr has received network equipment
for the initial deployment by the Greek Foundation for open-
source software and Internet connectivity from the regional
University of Applied Sciences. TakNet received financial
support from the Thai Network Information Centre Foundation
and initial equipment donation and support from the Network
Startup Resource Centre.
Depending on their level of participation public agencies
can sign collaboration agreements with the legal entity of the
CN and contribute economic or infrastructure resources with
or without compensation.
1) Socio-economic motives: The participation of public
agencies in a CN initiative can also have an economic mo-
tivation. In the case of guifi.net public agencies can fund the
network expansion through purchase of equipment in return
for complimentary added value services over the CN. Public
agencies may be interested in the added value of purchasing
connectivity services from a CPR infrastructure, as while being
competitive in price, can amplify the spill-over effects in the
local economy, and contribute to socio-economic development.
However, public entities may also be tempted to put obstacles
as a result of the influence and pressure of traditional large
telecom companies, with more taxation than large telecom or
Internet players that may enjoy unfair tax benefits.
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Services Private sector providers
Internet Service Provider (ISP)
Adit Slu, Ballus Informatica, Capa8, Cittec, Delanit, Del-Internet Telecom, Ebrecom,
Emporda Wifi - Guifi.net a l’Alt Emporda, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Indaleccius Broad-
casting, Pangea.org, Priona.net, S.G. Electronics, Steitec-Servei Te`cnic d’Electronica i
Telecomunicacions, Ticae, Xartic
Mobile Provider
Ballus Informatica, Capa8, Cittec, Delanit, Ebrecom, Emporda Wifi - Guifi.net al Alt
Emporda, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Indaleccius Broadcasting, Priona.net, S.G.Electronics,
Ticae
Surveillance
Ballus Informatica S.L., Capa8, Delanit, Ebrecom, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Matwifi,
S.G. Electronics, Ticae
Telephony (VoIP) Provider
Ballus Informatica, Capa8, Cittec, Delanit, Del-Internet Telecom, Ebrecom, Emporda
Wifi - Guifi.net a l’Alt Emporda, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Indaleccius Broadcasting,
Matwifi, Priona.net, S.G. Electronics, Ticae
TV (IpTv) Provider Delanit, Del-Internet Telecom, Indaleccius Broadcasting, Priona.net
Agreement types Service providers
Economic Activity Agreement Adit Slu, Asociacion SevillaGuifi, Associacio Guifinet la Bisbal d’Emporda, Ballus
Informatica, Capa8, Cittec, Delanit, Del-Internet Telecom, Ebrecom, Emporda Wifi -
Guifi.net al Alt Emporda, Girona Fibra, Goufone, Indaleccius Broadcasting, Ion Alejos
Garizabal, Maider Likona, Matwifi, Pangea.org, Priona.net, S.G.Electronics, Steitec-
Servei Tecnin d’Electronica I Telecomunicacions, Ticae, Xartic
Volunteer Agreement Cittec, Girona Fibra, Matwifi
TABLE IV: Private sector service providers in guifi.net and the services they provide.
2) Political motives: The participation of public agencies
in a CN often comes as a result of high-level policies against
the digital divide, to increase the offer or lower the costs of
local connectivity, and in favor of equal opportunities in the
digital economy and society.
3) Socio-cultural motives: Public agencies may also sup-
port CNs because they acknowledge their long-term potential
to strengthen the community links, raise awareness for issues
concerning the local societies and favor the engagement of
citizens with the commons. On the polar opposite and more
opportunistic note, local administrations (such as municipal-
ities) can advertise the provision of network services as a
political achievement that increases their re-election chances.
IV. ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY OF CNS: PRACTICE AND
THEORETICAL MODELS
CNs tend to use one or more of the following ways (see
also Table III-B3) to fund their activities [35]:
A. Member subscriptions and contributions in kind
This is the most common funding source for CNs. In this
case, the members of the CN contribute network equipment
and time/effort to the network growth and maintenance. In the
case of the BARN network, which provides fiber connectivity,
members even contribute digging effort. In most cases, the CN
users pay a monthly/annual subscription fee for the CN needs.
Several CNs such as AWMN in Greece, Ninux.net in Italy,
BARN in UK, and Freifunk.net in Germany, have managed to
scale significantly this way.
Despite its simplicity, the model has several variations. Sub-
scriptions may be mandatory or voluntary; or they may serve
as a prerequisite for participation in decision-making bodies
and award of voting rights. In the case of the Sarantaporo.gr, it
is villages under the network coverage, rather than individual
CN users, that are charged with a fee. How each village
will split the cost between local users is left to the the CN
participants in that specific village to define.
What the CN users get in return for their subscriptions is
closely related to the way the CN organizes and positions itself
in the telecommunications arena. For example, B4RN operates
as a community benefit society, which provides Internet ser-
vice to its subscribers. The subscription model is composed
of a connectivity fee and different service fees for different
types of users. On a similar note, Zenzeleni.net operates as a
cooperative telecommunications operator providing voice and
data services to its customers. TakNet has developed a social
enterprise called Net2Home. Users have to pay monthly fees
that are used for covering fiber (to the network operator),
maintenance, equipment installation, technical online support,
network management and monitoring costs. Rhizomatica helps
communities in Mexico build their networks, receiving a
flat rate for equipment installation and community member
training as well as a percentage of monthly subscription fees
for advisory and technical services. TFA practices a self-
sustainable business model, where the network relies on ISPs
to provide Internet access to its members.
Finally, but far more rarely, a CN may operate as a for-
profit company. Some of the FFDN networks in France are
commercial networks that indeed rely on policies such as
standard pay-per-use contracts and added value services to cus-
tomers outside the CN. However, in contrast with traditional
commercial companies that extract profit from customers and
locals to compensate the investors, CNs reinvest the profits in
the CPR infrastructure.
B. Donations from supporters
Community Networks are often financed through crowd-
funding projects or direct, regular or one-time, donations.
In some CNs, citizens can invest in the infrastructure. This
may happen for a specific reason such as crowdfunding the
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construction of a new link or the improvement of an existing
one that affects the user (typical in guifi.net); or in more
statutory manner, through the purchase of community shares,
to expand the local network or even the home access (in
B4RN). These investments can generate tax returns (guifi.net
Foundation or B4RN). In B4RN this investment also generates
(3%) interest after the third year.
External donors contribute funds in CNs in developing
areas such as in Zenzeleni (ZA), and Rhizomatica.But also in
Europe, Freifunk.net offers a good example of attracting such
support through a dedicated non-profit organization, which
is meant to require as little as possible (voluntary) effort.
For this reason, it has a relatively small number of regular
members and a large circle of supporting members, which can
all participate in the annual general meeting. The membership
includes a fee of either 60 EUR (or more) per year to
the Association’s account as annual sponsor membership, or
the monthly equivalent of 5 EUR (or more) for sustaining
membership.
Overall, this funding source typically complements other
funding sources such as the members’ subscription fees since
it rarely suffices to cover the CN’s funding needs.
C. Support from public agencies and institutions
There are cases, where CN initiatives have got generous
support from public funds (cash or in kind). Municipalities and
local authorities emerge as main actors in this respect. The syn-
ergy of commons/public service with civil society/municipality
can limit the survival concerns of CNs as far as one finds sus-
tainable models that motivate their cooperation [36], [37],[38].
One such case is the Sarantaporo.gr CN, which set up
its first nodes with hardware and equipment received from
the Greek Free/Open source Software Society (GFOSS); and,
later, expanded the CN through funding by the CONFINE
project [39], funded by the European Commission. Likewise,
much of the TFA start up funding came from foundations,
grants and bank loans. Likewise, in the case of Freifunk, the
support from public authorities was expressed through making
available public buildings such as churches or Town Halls for
placing and storing the network’s equipment (e.g., antennas).
Sometimes, the support may be expressed in more indirect,
yet equally significant, ways such as giving proper attention
to CNs in regulatory actions. The guifi.net Foundation has
developed a cooperative infrastructure sharing model (the
Universal deployment model) that develops over the Directive
2014/61/CE on broadband cost reduction of the EU10 and
the infrastructure sharing concept of the ITU11. The model
prescribes how municipalities and counties can regulate the
use of public space by private, government and civil society
in a sustainable manner [34].
Another instance of such support is the award of code
powers to B4RN in UK by Ofcom, the national regulator.
Such codes, also possessed by traditional telcos, allow network
builders to build and maintain infrastructure on streets without
10https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/
factsheets-directive-201461ce-broadband-cost-reduction
11https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/Trends08 exec A5-e.pdf
having to obtain a specific street works license. This way, they
become immune to town and country planning legislation, and
can apply to the courts to obtain rights to execute works on
private land if agreement cannot be reached with landowners.
The possession of code powers has enormously cut down on
the infrastructure deployment cost of the B4RN CN, both
in terms of compensations for traversing private land and
bureaucracy.
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Fig. 6: Radar chart with CN funding entities in a 0-3 scale.
CN funding sources. 0: mainly private entities’ involvement,
1: mainly public agencies’ involvement, small scale member
contribution 2: mainly member contribution (donations, non
regular fees), 3: member contribution only (regular fees).
D. Funding from third-party for-profit actors using the infras-
tructure
In the case of guifi.net, CNs have come up with unique
innovative models combining voluntary and professional ser-
vices into a commons-based approach. Commercial service
providers offer services over the CN and charge the CN
users as typical customers, but also subsidize the CN growth
and maintenance subscribing to the commons policies. This
way, the CN maintains its non-profit orientation and pursues
its sustainability through synergies with entities undertaking
commercial for-profit activities [17].
When assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the four
categories of funding sources, the following remarks are due:
• Some sources (i.e., donations, voluntary contributions
etc.) are one way or another not guaranteed and they
make long-term strategic planning difficult. They could
also lead to disagreements and conflicts between CN
members concerning their distribution inside the network,
especially if there are not well-defined decision-making
processes.
• Unless something dramatically changes on the regulation
side, the support of public authorities for CNs cannot be
taken for granted. BARN is one CN instance that tried
to access national funding without success (their bid for
the funding was eventually withdrawn). In the case of
guifi.net, the municipality of Barcelona is not willing to
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provide the CN with access to the city wi-fi and fiber
infrastructure. In general, CNs tend to view access to
local, national or European funds too difficult as well
as demanding, uncertain, and bureaucratic.
• The dominant view across CN initiatives is that the
funding from own resources is the most reliable and
favorable option. B4RN and Freifunk, two of the three
networks in Europe that have managed to scale in the
order of tens of thousands of nodes, have followed this
approach.
• Trying to put commercial service providers in the loop
while preserving the CN ideals, as guifi.net does, defi-
nitely represents an innovative approach. The success it
experiences in the case of the guifi network renders it a
valid funding model alternative.
Interestingly, only guifi.net so far has managed to involve
in its funding model all possible actors (end users/members,
private sector and public authorities). Striking the right balance
between the roles and contribution modes of these three parts
may prove the key towards the economic sustainability of CN
initiatives.
Fig. 6 summarizes the funding dependencies of the 16 CNs
on different sources.
E. Theoretical models of CN economic sustainability
The economic sustainability of CNs has also been the
subject of theoretical studies. The impact of pricing strategies,
network coverage and user preferences on the CN sustainable
operation is mainly explored therein with game-theoretic tools.
Maybe the first study of pricing issues in CNs is [40].
It is assumed that the end users have the alternative of a
commercial licensed based operator and the price they are
willing to pay for CN connectivity grows with the coverage
the CN achieves. Hence, the CN coverage and revenue evolve
over time and, depending on the price and initial CN coverage,
the result may be a competitive CN with high coverage or one
that dies out. The analysis identifies the pricing strategies of
the two operators at Nash equilibrium and the benefit resulting
for end users due to the competition between them.
In [41], the model in [40] is elaborated further to address
individual user mobility patterns, and different types of net-
work nodes to which users associate with different frequencies.
The assumption is that the CNO possesses complete or partial
information about the way users move and their differentiated
perception about the network’ coverage so that it can optimally
determine the subscription fees over a number of periods ahead
in time.
Afrasiabi and Guerin in [42] also propose a simple utility
function to model the users’ varying propensity to roam and
the emphasis they assign on network coverage. However,
and contrary to [40], their model also accounts for negative
externalities: as the users of the network grow, the roaming
traffic load increases and limits what is available to them, as
either home or roaming users. They find that a fixed pricing
policy generally fails to align the total welfare, i.e., the sum of
the operator’s revenue and the users’ utilities, with the profit
of the operator, exhibiting less flexibility than discriminatory
pricing and usage-based pricing strategies, which charge the
user differently if she is at home or roaming.
Finally, a study that is more directly inspired by the FON
service model [43] is presented in [44]. Three types of CN
user memberships are identified therein, depending on whether
users own an AP or not and whether they share and access
the CN APs free of charge (“Linus” users) or for a small
fee (“Bill” users). The CN users play a two-stage dynamic
game involving two different decisions at different time scales:
they select membership types over time intervals in the order
of months and how aggressively to access the shared radio
channel over time intervals in the order of a few minutes. The
authors analyze the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium strategies
and study when these are realized by best-response strategies.
V. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS IN CNS
To ensure a sustainable presence, CNs have put in place
diverse incentive mechanisms. As with other types of com-
mons [15], the main purpose of these mechanisms is to limit,
encourage and fuel the original motives for participation of
all types of actors. They also aim to prevent phenomena and
conditions that might weaken the original motivation of actors.
Such phenomena include mainly:
Free riding and selfish behaviors: many users are solely
interested in enjoying network connectivity without them-
selves contributing adequate or any resources to the CN. Such
behaviors can easily lead to the depletion of network resources
and CN degradation. Mechanisms for organizing and ensuring
users sustained contributions and distributing effort across
them are of significant importance.
Unclear CN legal status: CN actors (users or private sector
entities) may be deterred from joining the network and partic-
ipating in its activities if its legal status is not clear. Well
established operational and participation rules can alleviate
such effects.
In what follows, we review incentive mechanisms that
are either in place in different CNs or have been proposed,
without (yet) finding a path to implementation, in the literature.
In the latter context, we also review mechanisms that have
been proposed for similar systems such as wireless ad-hoc
networks, P2P systems, and virtual online communities. These
systems display inherent structural similarities with CNs in
that they also depend on the collective effort and cooperation
of their participants to fulfill their tasks: forward and route
data in wireless ad hoc networks, disseminate files and other
data in P2P systems, share effort and data in virtual online
communities.
The different incentive mechanisms aiming to motivate the
participation in CNs and strengthen their sustainability are
grouped into six categories (Fig. 7).
A. Enforcing fairness in users’ contributions and interactions
Despite the direct threat that free riding phenomena pose
to the network’s long-term sustainability, actual prevention
countermeasures are not that widespread in most CNs, with
the notable exception of guifi.net [2]. Interestingly, a quite
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Fig. 7: Categories of incentive mechanisms used in CNs.
broad range of solutions have been proposed in the literature,
either in the specific context of CNs or that of similar systems
(wireless ad-hoc, P2P, and online virtual communities) [45],
[46].
1) Direct reciprocity-based mechanisms: Reciprocity is a
broad term that incorporates the notion of human cooperation
in different interaction scenarios [47]. Direct reciprocity keeps
records of the interaction of two specific individuals so that the
accounts are settled between those two. The ”tit-for-tat” man-
ner of connecting to wireless CNs is quite common practice
between their members. For a node to connect to a CN, there
must be another node to which the connection is directed. In
many cases, the reciprocal sharing obligations stemming from
the participation in the CN, are explicitly described in licenses
such as the Wireless Commons License (WCL)[2]12 defined
in terms of neutrality and general reciprocation.
Direct reciprocity mechanisms can be described in various
contexts such as in sharing network connectivity or storage and
computing resources. The compensation tables in guifi.net is
a key resource to ensure the economic sustainability of the
network, ensuring a cooperative and cost-oriented model to
share the recurring costs and balance investment, maintenance
and consumption [17].
In terms of proposals, connectivity sharing is the objective
studied in [48]. A reciprocity algorithm, coupled with the
P2PWNC protocol in [49], keeps account of the services each
participant provides and consumes via technical receipts. This
way, it keeps a balance between the amount of traffic users
transfer and that they relay on behalf of others. The model
considers the provision of Internet access through the APs of
a wireless CN. Participants are divided into teams that manage
their own APs and consume/contribute traffic of/to another AP.
Reciprocity-based mechanisms for sharing storage and com-
puting resources are reported in [50], [51] and [52]. In [50]
and [51], the reciprocity-based mechanism is implemented
over a Community Cloud made out of shared computational
resources of the network members and is based on records
of participants’ efforts. Results indicate that the most suitable
structure for community clouds should distinguish between
ordinary nodes that possess cloud resources and super nodes
that are responsible for the management of resource sharing.
12http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Wireless Commons License
In [52], mobile devices used for computing, borrow CPU slots
in a reciprocal manner. It is suggested that the heterogeneity
in the amount of available resources may not be beneficial for
participants with large-scale resources.
2) Indirect reciprocity-based mechanisms: The concept of
direct reciprocity readily expands to that of indirect reci-
procity, which is essentially realized by reputation mech-
anisms. Indirect reciprocity does not consider two specific
individuals (like direct reciprocity) but rather asymmetric
random exchanges based on the reputation scores of each
individual node. Key issues in building reputation mecha-
nisms [53], involve keeping past behavior records (as node
reputation is partially built over time), carefully evaluating
all of the acquired information and distinguishing between
old data vs recently gathered ones. Among other challenges,
reputation-based systems have to face the impact of liars on
peer reputation i.e., nodes giving unreliable information about
other nodes. The system should be able to yield immediate
response to known misbehaving nodes by drawing from past
information.
The guifi.net classification of suppliers13 (professionals, vol-
unteers) provides a public ranked list according to reputation
of professionals and volunteers available for a range of tasks.
The list is based on the certification of their abilities based on
actual deployments or training courses.
Reputation mechanisms have been proposed for P2P sys-
tems and wireless ad-hoc networks. In [54], such a mechanism
is developed to build a reputation score for P2P system par-
ticipants. Each peer is described based on how much service
(bandwidth, computation) it provides and consumes. Peers
are encouraged to collaborate with each other and receive an
increase in their reputation metrics. The mechanism success-
fully results in peers making coalitions that eventually work
to their benefit. In a similar rationale for routing in mobile
ad-hoc networks (MANETs), the reputation technique aims at
isolating non-cooperative node behavior using the Confidant
protocol. The tamper-proof hardware, which is embedded in
nodes, keeps account of their virtual credit collected as they
contribute in packet forwarding. The reputation mechanism
in [55] keeps records of the collaboration activities of nodes
in the MANET and builds a reputation score for each node,
based on monitored collaboration data and information input
from other nodes.
3) Punishment of free-riders: Free riding is a quite com-
mon problem in commons, experienced in various forms
by each network type. The design of long-enduring CPR
institutions [15] requires graduated sanctions for appropriators
who do not respect community rules.
This implies defining the “boundaries”, determined by the
community license and agreements, and requires effective
conflict resolution methods that may include sanctions [2]. The
conflicts resolution system in guifi.net provides a systematic
and clear procedure for resolution of conflicts with participants
that negatively affect the common infrastructure resource, with
a scale of graduated sanctions. It consists of three stages -
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration- all of them driven
13https://guifi.net/en/node/3671/suppliers
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by a lawyer chosen from a set of volunteers. This has been
found critical to keep the infrastructure and the project itself
operational.
In multi-hop wireless networks, consumption of bandwidth
and energy serve as the main motivations for nodes’ free riding
behavior. Nodes enjoy packet forwarding of their own packets
by other nodes but defer, either deterministically or probabilis-
tically, from forwarding the packet of other nodes. Detection
and punishment of suspected free-riding nodes are the two
basic steps suggested for dealing with this phenomenon in the
corresponding literature.
In the generic setting in [56], it is suggested that free
riding should be confronted using exclusion of peers from a
group as a plausible threat. Misbehaving nodes are detected
through reputation protocols and excluded from the network
or community. Detection of selfish behaviors of mesh routing
nodes is carried out in [57] with a trust-based mechanism.
The mechanism can be developed based on the combined
observations of neighbor (and other) nodes of the CN such
as in KDet [58]. The Catch protocol in [59], tries to limit
the free riding problem in multi-hop wireless networks while
preserving anonymity. The adopted technique uses anonymous
messages and statistical tests to detect the selfishly behaving
nodes and isolate them. It relies on the assumption that free-
riding does not appear in the initial stages of the network
deployment but later, as the number of peers starts to grow. The
corresponding example in CNs reflects the fact that the initial
members, i.e., volunteers, create the CNs based on certain
principles and knowledge that are not compatible with free
riding practice. Members that join the network in subsequent
stages, i.e., users, are often not acquainted with these principles
and the importance of complying to them.
4) Direct and indirect financial compensation: This type
of mechanisms aim to support CNs’ economic sustainability.
Guifi.net, a representative example of this category, involves
private sector actors that provide commercial services in the
CN. To this end, it has set forth additional mechanisms
for compensating contributions of different stakeholders i.e.,
compensation system, provision of donation certificates [17].
The compensation system aims at settling imbalances be-
tween network usage and contributions (CAPEX or OPEX).
It is a way for participating entities to share network costs
while acquiring network resources. Private sector service
providers may assume the roles of operators that contribute
to the network and consume its resources, investors that only
contribute, and pure operators that only consume network
resources. Operators can contribute either to the deployment
of the infrastructure or to its maintenance.
The provision of donation certificates that are amenable
to tax deductions, is a way of acquiring indirect benefits
for contributing to a commons infrastructure. Users who pay
commercial service providers for service provision, can have
some tax deduction benefits as well according to the Spanish
legislation and regulation authorities.
Other mechanisms explored in the literature but not yet
validated in CNs are the following.
5) Community currencies: The design of community cur-
rencies is a way to enforce reciprocity and balance the contri-
butions of nodes to the network. As long as the cost/value of
nodes’ contribution can be quantified, community currencies
can ease the exchange of a wider set of services between
CN members and users of a CN and properly reward vol-
untary activities. At the same time, community currencies are
themselves collaborative activities that increase the community
spirit and strengthen the intrinsic motivations for participating
in a CN. In fact, the smooth operation of a community cur-
rency depends heavily on building trust between community
members both to accept and use the corresponding currency
but also to be able to provide risk-free credits that are very
important for the required flow of currency. This trust is a very
important asset that can play a key role in the initial birth and
sustainable operation of CNs. For the same reason (existing
trust and community values), the existence and operation
of a CN eases the launch of a community currency. The
development of community currencies for CNs is yet at an
initial stage but they pose a promising mechanism that exhibits
a complex bidirectional relation with CNs [35].
6) Other game-theoretic mechanisms for enforcing partic-
ipation: Participant’s motives for contributing in CNs can
be enhanced by game-theoretic and mechanism design ap-
proaches. An incentive mechanism based on a Stackelberg
game is provided in [60]. The objective is to stimulate user
and ISP provider participation in a hypothesis of a global
CN where the participating entities (users and ISPs) interact
with an intermediate entity, i.e., the community provider or
mediator.
Due to the cooperative nature of CNs, participation of peers
often needs to be combined with mutual cooperation i.e.,
forwarding packets, amongst them. While some works use
reputation-based mechanisms there are others that prefer credit
as a plausible economic incentive to sustain participation. The
works in [61], [62], [63] and [64] tackle this objective in
different types of systems i.e., P2P, static or mobile ad-hoc
systems.
In a P2P network setting [61], the prisoner’s dilemma is
chosen to design incentive techniques and deal with challenges
such as large populations with small lifetime, asymmetry of
interest in participation and multiple peer identities. In order to
enhance cooperation and avoid false identities and hijacking,
the mechanism proposes to keep records of peer interaction
and use them to build reputation metrics. In another approach,
the work in [62] uses game theory techniques to enhance
cooperation in static ad-hoc networks and suggests that the
most effective incentivizing structure is one that combines
actual incentive mechanisms i.e., actual credits as reputation
systems or virtual currencies, with mechanisms that target
players’ self interest and enjoyment. A Video on Demand
service on wireless ad hoc systems is the setting for the
Stackelberg game presented in [65]. In order to promote
cooperation among participants i.e., upload and forward data,
the content provider offers them rewards which vary across
actual payment, virtual credit or reputation points. A software
protocol in [63] combined with a game-theoretic aspect is
used to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes in mobile
ad-hoc networks. A cheat-proof and credit-based mechanism
determines node rewards and costs which are utilized for
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packet forwarding and route discovery.
B. Socializing processes and tools
CNs have developed a great variety of mechanisms to pro-
mote participation, interaction and knowledge dissemination
among CN members i.e., social events, meetings, new member
induction process. These mechanisms serve as a ”social”
incentive to encourage active involvement and engage new and
old members to CN processes and operation.
1) Social events and meetings: Large- and small-scale CNs
organize gatherings and events to discuss not only CN organi-
zational matters but also strengthen the bonds of community
members through social activities. Face to face meetings are
common practices. Depending on their morphology i.e., a sin-
gle network or network of networks, CN members have meet-
ings weekly, monthly or annually. CNs which are composed
of smaller networks (guifi.net, Ninux, Freifunk), tend to have
weekly or monthly face to face meeting at the local networks
and an annual global meeting to get together and discuss the
issues arising from the operation of the entire network. Other
CNs like AMWN, schedule frequent meetings (i.e., General
Assembly) when important organizational matters are up for
discussion.
2) New member induction processes: Depending on the
mentality and philosophy of the particular CN, interaction with
network members is a natural prerequisite for a newcomer’s
access to the network. The way that this interaction is later on
retained, is possible to determine their individual participation
level. For example in AWMN or guifi.net, new participants
are urged to register and communicate with nodes of phys-
ical proximity to them. After communicating with the node
owners, they are able to receive advice about the equipment
they need and acquire assistance from existing members in
setting up their own nodes and joining the network. Many
node owners provide public contact information for others
to contact them. In cases, where actual interaction with node
owners is not possible or for complementary assistance, users
can register to the website and post their questions in the CN’s
forum.
C. Education and training practices
Education and training of CN members is an important
aspect of CNs, addressing their members desire for acquir-
ing new skills and learn more about networking and radio
technologies. Seminars, workshops and online manuals are
the main deliverables of this line of effort, invested typically
by members of the volunteers’ group but also by other CN
members.
1) Workshops and seminars: Several workshop and seminar
events are organized by existing CNs (AWMN, Sarantaporo.gr,
guifi.net). Experienced members share their knowledge with
new members, exchange ideas and present available technical
solutions. Guifi.net is quite active in organizing workshops
and training seminars i.e., guifi labs14 15, the SAX16, or
14http://www.guifiraval.net/
15https://guifi.net/en/event
16https://sax2016.guifi.net
supports related events FOSDEM17, the Dynamic Coalition
on Community Connectivity (DC3)18.
AWMN workshops aim at enhancing members’ technical
skills by disseminating knowledge and technical expertise, in-
teracting with people that have the same interests, strengthen-
ing the bonds within the community and new member training.
In a different approach, Sarantaporo.gr workshops are more
focused to the broader community of locals (with or without
technical expertise), inform people about the operation of the
network and share knowledge over the wireless networking
principles and the development of community networks.
2) Online material for DIY fans: CNs invest effort to derive
manuals and how-to documents so that users can learn more
about technical matters and be able to set up their own nodes.
Freifunk, Ninux, AWMN, guifi.net follow this practice and
develop guides that provide technical instructions on actions
and requirements of setting up nodes, FAQs and other useful
information. Participants are encouraged to self-educate and
”take matters into their own hands” instead of relying to
”experts” and behaving as consumers of service. In cases,
where online material is not enough they can always get advice
in CN forums, or retrieve contact info of node owners.
D. Local applications and services as incentives
The applications running over the network can themselves
be considered as mechanisms motivating persons to join the
network19. Such services range from network connectivity to
communication, entertainment and privacy. Social tools such
as clouds, chats, forums, data exchange and entertainment are
present in a variety of CNs and they usually gather the interest
of the most active users within the CN.
CN services and applications that store data or process
locally can serve as privacy-related incentive mechanisms for
CN participants avoiding the exposure to not well understood
and often privacy-unfriendly practices of commercial data
storage solutions. More often than not, such services involve
the deployment of distributed cloud solutions that are deployed
locally across the CN nodes, that process and store users’
data without dependence on external cloud services or need to
interact with the public Internet.
The implementation of Cloudy in the Guifi.net is a char-
acteristic example of community cloud services. Cloudy is
an open source community cloud platform designed to host
local applications in CNs. The software is run in distributed
computing devices owned by CN participants. It provides
services such as infrastructure services, service discovery,
network management and user services (PaaS) [67] and it is
open to the provision of new ones as Docker containers that
can be shared amongst the community.
17Free and Open Source Software Developers’ European Meeting: https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FOSDEM
18https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/175-igf-2015/
3014-dynamic-coalition-on-community-connectivity-dc3
19There are arguments both in favour of the importance of local services
in CNs [66], but also doubts that local services can make an impact on CNs
considering that public Internet covers any application needs on the side of
the user [11].
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Mechanisms Volunteers Users Private sector service providers Public agencies
Direct reciprocity x
Indirect reciprocity x
Punishment of free-riders x
Community currencies x x
Game-theoretic x x
Financial compensation x
Local data storage infrastructure x
Social events and meetings x x
New member induction processes x
Workshops and seminars x
Online material for DIY fans x
Local applications and services x
Operation as legal entities x x x
Licenses and Agreements x x
TABLE V: Incentive mechanisms and relevance to the CN stakeholders.
Fig. 8: Community cloud in Guifi.net running the Cloudy
distribution on diverse hardware.
Cloud computing infrastructures can be developed in var-
ious ways but face severe challenges due to the nature of
CNs: hardware and software diversity with various options for
inexpensive material, decentralized management, where users
contribute and manage their own resources, and rapid changes
in the number of contributing nodes.
There are quite a few possible ways to extend the func-
tionalities of Community Clouds. CN resource sharing be-
yond bandwidth resources can be extended to computing re-
sources [31]. A Community Cloud can be used in conjunction
with Grid Computing techniques [68]. Distributed Community
Clouds that follow the topology of CNs can be enhanced with
techniques to incentivize resource sharing according to nodes’
levels of resource contribution [50].
Besides the aforementioned cloud services, CNs can host
other types of applications as well. Several CNs have imple-
mented a broad variety of services and applications, while
others are at a more initial stage of service and application
provision. In CNs like Sarantaporo.gr and i4Free, the main
service of interest is Internet access. Yet, Internet access is
not always on offer by the CN: Ninux does not provide any
Internet service at all; guifi.net offers the ability only through
private Internet service providers operating over the CN; and,
in other networks, such as the AWMN, members occasionally
share their Internet connections with other users through APs.
Networks built by people with technological background
tend to elaborate more on the provision of non-professional
services. Tools for communication such as chat, email servers,
mailing lists, wikis, forums, data exchange, entertainment like
broadcast radios, podcasts and streaming are common services
found in most CNs (AWMN, Ninux, Freifunk, guifi.net).
AWMN and Ninux users have also access to VoIP and chats,
guifi.net users to videoconferencing, AWMN and guifi.net
users to local clouds and FFDN, Freifunk and AWMN users
to collaborative writing tools. Apart from the basic services
used in most CNs, there are also several CN-specific ones,
i.e., multi-player gaming, broadcasting, live streaming, e-
learning, local search engines (Quicksearch, Wahoo, Woogle)
in AWMN, web proxies, FTP or shared disk servers, XMPP
instant messaging servers, IRC servers, cloud services as the
Cloudy distribution [67] in guifi.net, Internet cube, BitTorrent
tracker, IndeCP or Internet service in FFDN, private VoIP
service and weather monitoring in Sarantaporo.gr.
Besides the applications that are currently in use in different
CNs, several others have been proposed in literature or are
currently under development.
Crowdsourcing applications are one such example. They
have the potential to match very well the participatory nature
of wireless community networks, i.e., participatory network-
ing [25] and the strong community-oriented social struc-
ture met in most developing regions. In the crowdsourcing
paradigm, individual users solicit information, content or ser-
vice from groups of people. The community dimension only
strengthens the case for such applications since the community
bonds serve as additional socio-psychological incentives for
the active participation and contributions of end users. The
resources that CN members share can serve as the media,
where users (mobile or not) connect to post tasks or get
informed about available task announcements. Users receive
explicit rewards such as monetary payments or virtual credits
for services they offer [69].
Another example is VoIP services. Nomadic users (con-
sumers of bandwidth) utilize the community-based Internet
access (producers of bandwidth) to get VoIP, as a low cost
alternative to traditional cellular telephony [70], [71].
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E. Lawful framework of operation
An operational framework of CNs (legal status, rights,
obligations) which is not well defined may impede the at-
traction of new participants. The level of support of CN
initiatives by the state or local administration has an impact
on users’ decisions to join or not the network [72]. When
local authorities or another third-party organization with clear
legal status are involved, e.g., by signing licenses, the user’s
concerns are easier overcome and the decision to participate
looks far less risky. The response of most CN initiatives to
these reservations is to develop legal entities, and set forth
licenses and agreements as legal documents specifying the
terms and conditions of participation in the network.
1) Operation as legal entities: The majority of CNs have
developed legal entities to represent the network to third
parties (Table III-B3). For example, Guifi.net created the
guifi.net Foundation, AWMN the Association of AWMN,
FFDN consists of non-profit member organizations registered
as telecom operators, Sarantaporo.gr operates as a non-profit
civil partnership subject to the Greek legal framework about
NPOs, Freifunk has the Forderverein freie Netzwerke e.V. as
a reference NPO authority, TakNet is a social enterprise and
B4RN a community benefit society.
2) Licenses and Agreements: Besides the legal status, CNs
normally make use of legal documents, such as Licenses
and Agreements, to specify the frame of their members’
participation and their own interaction with third-party entities.
Guifi.net and FFDN utilize a Network Commons License
(NCL) for establishing the rights and duties of subscribed
participants. Moreover, guifi.net has developed collaboration
agreements (Type A, Type B, Type C) that define the terms of
conditions of third party collaboration within the network. Any
private sector entity that wants to perform economic activities
and use a significant amount of resources of the network has
to sign an Agreement with the Foundation and participate
in the compensation system (section V-A4). Freifunk uses
the PicoPeering Agreement that promotes the free exchange
of data within the network Ninux participants comply with
the Ninux manifesto, which is a variation of the PicoPeering
Agreement.
F. Incentive mechanism classification
Several of the incentive mechanisms that are described
in sections from V-A to V-E have never gone beyond the
paper analysis stage. On the other hand, several others are
indeed applied in existing CNs. The financial compensation
system of guifi.net, the social events, meetings and workshops
organized by many CNs, the adoption of licences in Freifunk
and guifi.net, as well as the introduction of a lawful operational
framework serve, one way or another, as incentive mechanisms
that motivate the participation of different types of stakehold-
ers in CN initiatives, as shown in Table V-C2.
Some of these incentive mechanisms apply almost invari-
ably to all CNs. The lawful operational status, for example, is
mandatory if the CN wants to attract critical masses of users,
but also private sector entities and the support from public
agencies. Equally common among CNs is the care for social
events and meetings that can strengthen the links between
their members and satisfy socio-cultural motives of users.
On the contrary, incentive mechanisms of economical nature,
such as the financial compensation scheme and the donation
certificates issued bu guifi.net for tax deduction purposes are
more relevant in CNs that support commercial operations over
them.
For sure, it would be rather wise to match the incentive
mechanisms with the different stakeholder types. Hence, vol-
unteers would be more responsive to incentive mechanisms
that underline political and cultural causes; private sector ser-
vice providers would respond, maybe exclusively, to incentive
mechanisms with economic implications; and local authorities
will be much more prone to get involved when they realize
that public expenses can be saved or some political strategic
objective be served through this involvement.
By far, the majority of incentive mechanisms target CN
users. One aspect that is not well understood is how the
effectiveness of a mechanism varies with different features of
the community; namely, if we could have a characterization
of a community according to a fixed set of attributes (urban
vs. rural, educational level, professional background, domi-
nant political preferences) that could predict which incentive
mechanism would best mobilize its members. An important
parameter in this context is the size of the community. Char-
acterizations along attributes is easier if the community is
small20 and with roughly uniform interests and professional
background. As their size grows, such characterizations be-
come harder and so does any attempt to predict the suitability
of incentive mechanisms.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
In what follows we codify main lessons learned through the
almost two-decade long experience with CNs:
• The economic sustainability of a CN requires self-funding
procedures, through which the CN will be able to cover
the necessary expenses. Funding can arise also from
private donations, collaborations with commercial service
providers, or public subsidies. Nevertheless, the expe-
rience suggests that the CN should be able to secure
its main funding through subscriptions and local re-
sources of its own members. In one case, e.g., the B4RN
network [4], the CN issues shares that are purchased
by community members. Both in the case of B4RN
and guifi.net, the investments/donations to the CN are
awarded with tax deductions. In any case, the economic
models need to take into account the specificities of each
CN since not all models can be exported from one to
another [73].
• The way that a CN is approached by the surrounding envi-
ronment also depends on the way that the CN approaches
the pool of people it refers to. The impact of a CN is
greatly dependent on the way that the people in the area
embrace it. It is usually measured in terms of satisfying
basic needs such as provision of appealing services or
20But not too small. The CN will not be sustainable if there are not enough
human resources to pull from.
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applications. This demands a deep understanding of the
daily life and problems of the local population and
measures for inclusiveness of a variety of people.
• Ambiguity in terms of CN organization and lawful op-
eration may hurt the sustainable interest in the CN. The
CN operations should be clearly stated internally to its
own community and area of operation and externally
to third parties, organizations, other companies, govern-
ments. The establishment of a legal entity for the CN and
the use of licenses detailing the terms and conditions of
participation in the CN are key to its viability.
• Competition and legal disputes with telecom companies
can jeopardize the entire CN project. Instead, the CN
should invest effort to establish, and favor through its
operational models, synergies with other stakeholders,
including private sector companies.
• Access to the network has to be regulated in order to
avoid depletion of network resources and unfairness in
participation. Free riding and selfish behaviors can be
dealt by using blockchains and community currencies,
reciprocity-based mechanisms, but also penalty-driven
mechanisms.
• The human factor is important. Human interaction should
be promoted either through socializing process leveraging
both online tools and face-to-face meetings. Education
and training practices as well as locally focused applica-
tions such as community cloud computing and services
are also important. Together, they promote cooperation
amongst participants, create a local sense of ownership,
and develop digital sovereignty through experimentation
and exchange of knowledge.
In summary, sustainability cannot be reached following a
set of exhaustive rules and there are no clearcut answers for
approaching it. However, checkpoints or indicative guidelines
can be used to assess it. An attempt to summarize those is
the evaluation form presented in the appendix, which is the
outcome of fieldwork in the context of [11].
VII. OPEN CHALLENGES AT THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND
REGULATORY FRONT
The practices of CNs and their creativity in addressing
the multifaceted motives of their stakeholders, as exposed
in sections III-V, are key to their sustainability. Yet, there
are further challenges at the technological and the policy-
making/regulatory front that will also prove decisive in their
sustainability question. In the remainder of this section, we
review these challenges and for each one we describe current
practices or possible directions for coping with them.
A. Technology
1) Community networks and LTE Unlicensed: The strong
growth of mobile data traffic over the last years has increased
the demand for additional capacity and spectrum resources for
mobile cellular networks. One of the solutions promoted by
the telecom industry is to expand the LTE standard to also
operate in unlicensed spectrum. The band considered in this
context is the 5 GHz UNII (Unlicensed National Informa-
tion Infrastructure) band, which is used by Wi-Fi networks
(IEEE 802.11a/n/ac/ax) but also other wireless systems such
as weather radars and medical devices [74]. This potential
coexistence of LTE with WiFi has raised concerns to many
operators of WiFi networks, including CNs, who are afraid
that LTE might completely crowd WiFi out of the band by
utilizing all the available bandwidth [75]. The studies that
have been carried out on the impact of this co-existence report
contradicting outcomes. Those from telecom industry (e.g.,
[76]) have been rather comforting hinting at a low impact of
this co-existence on the performance of WiFi networks. Other
studies [77], [78] reported a fully asymmetrical impact on the
two systems, WiFi networks being the ones that suffer serious
performance degradation.
In either case, the battle for CNs, and more broadly WiFi
network operators, relates to rendering LTE radio technology
friendlier against WiFi. This implies adding mechanisms to
the standard that enable it to share the spectrum resources
of the unlicensed band with WiFi and other systems. The
friendliness of these mechanisms, which are sketched in Fig. 9
and briefly presented in the remainder of this subsection, varies
considerably.
Dynamic Channel Selection: This refers to the basic flexi-
bility that can be embedded into LTE implementations so that
LTE devices choose idle channels for their transmissions in the
unlicensed band, when such are available. This is a must-have
capability for LTE but does not address the cases of conflict
with WiFi systems.
Duty cycling: This mechanism is considered in countries
such as China, South Korea but also United States, where
the telecom regulations pose an upper limit to the time that
transmission bursts from any given system can occupy the
spectrum in an unlicensed band. The mechanisms demands
that LTE cells periodically interrupt their own transmissions
to let devices of other systems such as WiFi, take their turn in
making transmissions. The mechanism is incorporated in the
3GPP LTE Release 10 system as the Almost Blank Subframe
(ABS) capability in the context of LTE HetNets, the term used
by 3GPP to denote networks that consist of cells of various
sizes, including femto-, pico, micro-, and macrocells. There,
the ABS mechanism aims to manage the interference betweem
different types of cells, by restricting data transmissions from
the macro cell in certain time (sub)frames, which can then be
used by smaller cells in parallel. The mechanism envisages
some flexibility with respect to the duration of these cycles,
in that the LTE blank subframes can be shorter or longer
depending on utilization of the band by the LTE and other
systems.
Listen-Before-Talk: With Listen-Before-Talk (LBT), devices
aiming to transmit first sense the medium and continue to
transmit as long as they do not detect another transmission
for some time interval, mainly in the form of electromagnetic
energy that exceeds considerably the level of white noise.
If they do, they back off and only reattempt a transmission,
sensing the medium anew, after some time interval (back-off
time). The mechanism reduces the probability of collisions
between transmission of the same or different systems using
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the unlicensed band. Implementation of the LBT mechanism is
mandatory for LTE in Europe and Japan, where the legislation
demands this medium sensing before any transmission in the
unlicensed bands. Current proposals for the LBT implementa-
tion in 3GPP differentiate with respect to (a) whether the back-
off is random or not; (b) as far as it is random, whether its
value is drawn from a window of possible values (contention
window) that is fixed or variable. For comparison, the carrier
sense mechanism standardized for years in WiFi networks im-
plements random backoff with a variable contention windows
that increases with the anticipated congestion in the medium.
Clearly, such as solution is the friendliest implementation of
the LBT mechanism and the preferred one by WiFI network
operators, including the CN operators.
Dynamic channel  selection 
Duty cycling 
LTE on LTE on 
WiFi  access  opportunities
LTE off LTE off
Duty cycle  period 
Time
Listen before talk
Fig. 9: Candidate solutions for co-existence of WiFi and LTE
in unlicensed bands.
2) Community networks and 5G: The LTE technology will
be the cornerstone for the next generation of mobile cellular
systems, commonly advertised as 5G. Highly ambitious per-
formance indicators have been been set for these systems [79]
including: 1000-fold increase of the aggregated network ca-
pacity; 10-fold decrease of the latency, when compared to 4G;
access speeds exceeding 100Mbps for 95% of the users; up to
10.000 connected devices per Base Station (BS).
Such objectives call for extreme densification and diver-
sification of the radio network access points, all the way
from macro- down to femto-cells. They also assume break-
throughs in the physical layer technologies that will help
overcome the adverse radio propagation conditions in the mm
wavelength range (30-300GHz) and render them usable for
mobile wireless communications [79]. Finally, they demand
cost-effective technologies in the backhaul network to support
the high data rates promised in the radio access network. The
only technology currently available for the backhaul network
is optic fiber. Yet, the fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) deployment
requires considerable investments, which are currently ongoing
in urban areas but are unlikely to experience in suburban and
rural areas [80]. So far, no plan has been articulated for the
5G profitability in rural and suburban areas with low average
revenues per user (ARPU). Hence, the plausible concern is
that 5G will end up enlarging the gap between those connected
and those unconnected, rather than bridging it, by improving
further the connectivity of those who already have it and
raising the cost barrier higher for the rest [81] [82].
Community networks could play a significant role in dis-
proving such concerns. They often have become bearers of
innovative cost-effective communications solutions, essentially
leveraging the high availability of WiFi-enabled phones even
in areas of low ARPU. In the Serval project [83], they use
low-end battery-powered devices to realize a backhaul mesh
network at UHF frequencies that presents 802.11 access points
to end users. Likewise, in the LibreRouter project, launched
by the Altermundi NGO in Argentina, they produce fully open
multi-radio 802.11 access points, with support for Wi-Fi and
other wireless access technologies [84]. Their aim is to ease
the deployment of wireless mesh networks by communities
without demanding almost any technical skill.
Nowadays, with the use of directional antennas, proprietary
extensions to the MAC layer implemented by many vendors,
and multiple gateways, CNs have managed to scale up and
provide exceptional access rates to their users at significantly
lower cost than cable-driven solutions. They have even shown
their potential to scale up the overall capacity by deploying
their own optic fiber cables. Although the fiber deployment
costs per mile, including roadwork, licenses etc, amounts lies
in the order of 60,000USD [4], communities in rural areas
have managed to suppress this cost considerably by laying
fiber in private land and mobilizing the community in the fiber
deployment work.
3) Security: The security challenges for CNs are not intrin-
sically different from what other networks face. The greatest
advantage of CNs, when compared to other network infrastruc-
tures, technologies or service models, refers to data privacy.
The operation of the network, including security policies and
incidents, is handled by a mix of professionals and volunteers.
This is both a strength since users are on average better
trained and committed, and a weakness as diversity means
less uniform control. Open participation in the governance of
the network infrastructure demands that participants, including
end-users, are more aware and can decide on data privacy
policies and practices. The result is that typically data is kept,
saved and processed at a local level without being exposed
to public and commercial storage and processing units in the
Internet. In wireless CNs, users do not need to authenticate
and utilize sensitive credentials for connecting to the network.
In some networks, like Freifunk or guifi.net, participants offer
anonymous Internet access proxies and the CN organization
provides technical and legal support to preserve the service.
Although this feature is of great importance for preserving user
anonymity, it can sometimes make the network susceptible to
misuse and free riding behaviors.
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B. Policy making and regulation
There are recommendation from international organizations
such as ITU, Internet Society or United Nations to define
regulatory frameworks that facilitate the universalization of
Internet access for development and participation in society.
The D-REC-D.19 [85] by ITU (2010) recommends to include
provision of telecommunications/ICTs in rural and remote
areas in their national development plans, and highlights the
importance of community access to ICT facilities and services.
The Internet Society (ISOC) is one among several other civil
society organizations that insists on the need for universal,
open and sustainable Internet access [86]. The United Nations
has declared in numerous events that sustainable development
goals cannot be achieved without affordable and universal
access to ICTs and broadband connectivity, and has defined
Goal 9.c. as “significantly increase access to ICT and strive to
provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least
developed countries by 2020”.
However, at the policy-making level, CNs need to cope with:
1) Lack of national legislation: Up to now, most countries
lack a clear regulatory framework addressing the existence of
CNs. Hence, they often tend to operate in a gray zone, which
evidently poses limits their development potential and their
visibility.
Having said this, and in the context of recommendation
ITU D-REC-D.19 and others, there are cases of countries that
have put forward a favorable legal framework for CNs. These
include initiatives for sharing licensed spectrum/dynamic spec-
trum Access in the TV White Spaces (TVWS) in regions of
Asia, Africa and America; innovative licensing schemes such
as TVWS or 5GHz spectrum backed by social or welfare
purpose in India; the GSM spectrum (824-849 and 869-894
MHz) specifically for social purpose use in Mexico; and the
new regulation on radio equipment that eliminates licensing
requirements for providers serving fewer than 5,000 users in
Brazil [87].
2) Lack of representation in policy-making bodies: At the
moment, CNs lack an institution that could give them repre-
sentation and strengthen their voice in global policy-making
organizations. Instances of federation exist at national level:
guifi.net, in Spain, the French association FFDN, in France,
Ninux, in Italy are all CN associations in Europe bringing to-
gether several CNs that operate locally in villages/towns/cities.
This form of organization emerged primarily as a means to
more efficiently address organizational aspects and share costs
of Internet connections.
However, there is no concrete federal representation at
continental or global level, which would provide CNs with
credible representation in meetings with stakeholders such as
governments and global organizations, and let them intervene
to global policies more effectively. The need for such repre-
sentation was best evidenced, at least in Europe, in the case of
the Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU 21. The directive,
which was issued in 2014 with the purpose of harmonizing
the relevant legislation across EU member states, prohibits
21http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX\
%3A32014L0053
changes in the software/firmware running on wireless devices
by third parties. This has been a severe blow for European
CNs since many of them could grow exactly by altering
the software/firmware of commercial off-the-shelf wireless
network equipment.
There are currently attempts to fill this gap. A step towards
this direction was the Open Letter 22 addressed to EU policy-
makers with respect to the ongoing revision of Telecoms
Code. This letter was co-authored and signed by a number of
CNs and supporting organizations worldwide. Similar efforts
are currently ongoing within the Internet Society to establish
a Special Interest Group on CNs. Its mission will be to
serve as an umbrella organization that will promote the CN
requirements and organize interventions in policy-making and
regulation bodies about them. It will also assist in establishing
new legal frameworks that will recognize CNs as alternative
telecommunication networks, acknowledge their impact and
specificities and safeguard their rights and existence when
needed.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Our survey has addressed the issue of sustainability in
community networks, accounting for the various political,
socio-cultural and economic perspectives of their participants
and stakeholders. We explained how CNs instantiate open and
shared network infrastructure models, when compared to the
dominant trend of vertical business models in the telecoms
sector. Possible funding sources were analyzed, including their
members’ subscriptions and funds from private and public
entities. Economic sustainability is a challenging issue, which
seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
sustainable operation of the CN. Satisfying socio-cultural and
politic aspirations is also key to this end.
The activities of each CN involve a specific mix of four
types of stakeholder entities (i.e., volunteers, users, private
sector entities, public agencies). Representative CNs have been
discussed with respect to incentive mechanisms they put in
place to motivate the engagement of these stakeholders. We
have highlighted best practices and lessons learned in this
respect, together with challenges of technical and regulatory
nature for the long-term sustainability of the CN paradigm.
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APPENDIX A
SUSTAINABILITY CHECKPOINTS
1) Economy: Market and model of provision
• To which extent is the community network supported by
non-profit/community based network access and services
provision?
• To which extent does the community network rely on a
commercial provider? What is the nature of this provider
22https://lqdn.co-ment.com/text/Rl42W44XAc6/view/
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(e.g. for-profit vs. social enterprise, or local vs. non-
local)?
• To which extent does the model of network provision
of the community network face competition from com-
mercial for-profit telcos on the basis of quality of sig-
nal/provision, lower cost and/or better network mainte-
nance?
Resources:
• To which extent does the community network manage
to survive economically, i.e. to afford the necessary
hardware and labour-power necessary for running the
network?
• To which extent can the community network ensure that
it has enough resources, supporters, workers, volunteers,
and users?
• To which extent does the community network rely on
internal funding sources?
• To which extent does the community network rely on
external funding sources? How regular are they?
• Are there possibilities for the community network to
obtain public or municipal funding or to co-operate with
municipalities, public institutions or the state in providing
access and services?
• To which extent does the community network rely on a
single individual or a small group of actors for providing
the necessary resources (time, skills, money)?
Network wealth for all:
• To which extent does the community network provide
gratis/cheap/affordable network and Internet access for
all?
• If subscriptions are used, are they affordable?
• To which extent are there different pricing schemes such
as for residential users, small enterprises, bigger firms,
and public institutions (e.g. schools)?
• How can the community avoid or lower the digital divide?
• What technological skills are required of the average user
to benefit from the community network?
Needs:
• To which extent are the community needs served by the
community network?
• To which extent are the needs of diverse individuals (e.g.
by gender, age, nationality) and groups in the community
served by the community network?
• To which extent are the needs of local businesses served
by the community network?
2) Politics: Participation/governance
• How is the community network governed? How does
it decide on which rules, standards, licences, etc. are
adopted?
• To what extent does the community network allow and
encourage the participation of community members in
governance processes?
• To what extent are there in place mechanisms for conflict
resolution and for proceedings in the case of the violation
of community rules?
Data ownership and control
• To which extent does the community network enhance
the protection of privacy of user data?
• To which extent does the community network provide
opportunities for active user involvement in the manage-
ment of their data? What are the skills required and how
are they provided?
• To which extent and for how long are user data kept in
servers controlled centrally (e.g. by the network adminis-
trators)? How do you guarantee that data storage is done
in line with data protection regulation and is privacy-
friendly?
3) Culture: Community spirit:
• How closely knit is the community? To which extent are
trust and solidarity present and how are they manifested?
• To which degree is the community network a geek public
that has an elitist, exclusionary culture or a community
public that is based on a culture of unity in diversity?
• To which extent does the community network provide
mechanisms for learning, education, training, commu-
nication, conversations, community engagement, strong
democracy, participation, co-operation, and well-being?
In what ways?
• To which degree is the community network able to foster
a culture of togetherness and conviviality that brings
together people? In what ways?
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